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From an Associated Press story dated June 18, 1982:
Cheyenne, Wyo. (AP) Attorney General William French Smith
renounced a broad federal claim to scarce water resources in the
West on Thursday, reversing a Carter administration ruling that
had angered those states affected.
Smith stated that Wyoming Attorney General Stephen
Freudenthal had said recently that the Carter doctrine "creates a
nightmare for Western states' water resources management."
But Smith said, "I am here today to tell you and the nation that
the nightmare is over."
The "nightmare" began in 1979 with the announcement by the
Solicitor's Office of the Department of the Interior of the existence of
federal "non-reserved" water rights. In an opinion1 analyzing the nature
and extent of non-Indian federal water rights for the National Park
Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation and the Bureau
of Land Management, Solicitor Leo Krulitz concluded that by the
enactment of various land management statutes, "Congress authorized the
United States to appropriate unappropriated water available on the public
domain"' without regard to the substantive provisions of state law.3
On January 16,1981, a Supplemental Opinion 4 was issued by the new
Solicitor, Clyde 0. Martz. This opinion amended and modified the prior
Krulitz opinion by concluding that neither the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)5 nor the Taylor Grazing Act of 19766
authorized the Bureau of Land Management to claim water rights under
the broad "non-reserved" water rights theory.7 The National Park Service,
Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Reclamation were not, however,
1. Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of
Reclamation and the Bureau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979).
2. 86 Interior Dec. at 615.
3. Id. at 577.
4. Supplement to Solicitor Opinion No. M-36915, on Federal Water Rights of the National
Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation and the Bureau of Land Management,
88 Interior Dec. 253 (1981).
5. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976).
6. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-316 (1976).
7. 88 Interior Dec. at 257-58.
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included with the Bureau of Land Management and the door was left open
for these agencies to assert the existence of a federal "non-reserved" water
right.8
This door appeared to slam shut on September 11, 1981 when the
current Solicitor, William H. Coldiron issued an opinion in which he
concluded that "there is no federal 'non-reserved' water right." 9 Solicitor
Coldiron asserted that only the two traditional exceptions to the general
policy of state control over water resources exist: the federal navigation
servitude and the federal reserved right.10
In a recent legal memorandum" issued by the Department of Justice,
the federal "non-reserved" water right asserted by Solicitor Krulitz was
again shut out: "We conclude that the broad federal non-reserved water
rights theory asserted by Solicitor Krulitz is not supported by an analysis of
the applicable statutes and judicial decisions."' 1 Nevertheless, Attorney
General William French Smith and Assistant Attorney General Theodore
B. Olson added that "we do not believe it is appropriate to reach a blanket
conclusion that under existing federal statutes no implied federal water
rights exist except for reserved rights."'"
This comment will summarize, compare and contrast the opinions
written by the three solicitors as well as the legal memorandum prepared
by the Department of Justice and will discuss the legal consequences that
follow.
II. THE KRULITZ OPINION
On June 25, 1979, Solicitor Krulitz issued an opinion' to the
Secretary of the Interior which discussed United States' water rights on
federal lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management, the
National Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Bureau of
Reclamation. The opinion was in compliance with President Carter's
Water Policy directive of June 6, 1978, to "expeditiously identify, establish
and quantify [the Department of the Interior's] non-Indian federal
reserved water rights."'"
In response to the President's directive, Solicitor Krulitz briefly
8. Non-reserved Water Rights-United States Compliance with State Law, 88 Interior Dec.
1055 (1981).
9. 88 Interior Dec. at 1064.
10. Id.
11. Federal "Non-Reserved" Water Rights, Legal Memorandum, United States Dept. of
Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (June 16, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
12. Memorandum at 4.
13. Id. at 6.
14. 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979).
15. Id. at 562.
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reviewed the reserved rights doctrine and undertook a complete inventory
of the reserved water rights that could be asserted on federal land.' 6 In
summary, he stated that reserved water rights have been judicially inferred
where the Federal Government has set aside a reservation of land for a
specific purpose but did not expressly reserve water to fulfill that purpose.
17
The right has a priority date as of the date of the creation of the
reservation. "' Compliance with state water law is not required. 19 The
amount of water reserved is the amount necessary to fulfill the purposes of
the reservation on the date the reservation was created2 0 whether or not the
reservation made actual use of the water at that time.21 However, water is
reserved only for the primary purposes of the reservation and water rights
for secondary purposes must be acquired in some other manner.22
The reserved water rights doctrine has been judicially defined through
extensive litigation. 23 Although there remains a number of unanswered
questions regarding actual quantification and jurisdiction, no objection
could be made to Krulitz' brief summation of this concept in his opinion.
Solicitor Krulitz took the President's directive one step further,
however, and set forth his legal analysis for the assertion of "non-reserved"
federal water rights. It is this analysis that will be summarized here.
Krulitz first examined the ownership theory of federal water rights.
16. Id. at 571-74.
17. In the landmark decision, Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the United States,
on behalf of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation, sought to enjoin upstream appropriators from
diverting water from the Milk River. The Treaty of May 1,1888 had made no mention of water rights
for the Indian Reservation. The Court held that "the power of the government to reserve the waters and
exempt them from appropriations under state laws is not denied, and could not be. (citations omitted).
That the government did reserve them we have decided, and for a use which would be necessarily
continued through years." The Court reasoned that without water, the lands were "practically
valueless" and that Congress could not have intended that result. Id. at 577.
18. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963). The Court determined that the United
States had reserved the waterfor the Indians as it was obviously needed to effectuate the purpose of the
reservation. However, a lower court has held that certain Indian reserved water rights have a priority
date from time immemorial because the water was used for certain purposes long before a reservation
was created. United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (1979).
19. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
20. Cappaertv. United States, 426 U.S. 128,141 (1978). The Court used restrictive language in
holding that only the minimum amount of water necessary to preserve the "pupfish" at Devil's Hole
National Monument was reserved. The doctrine "reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill
the purpose of the reservation, no more." -
21. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 600. The Court concluded that the implied water right
was intended to satisfy future as well as present needs of the reservation.
22. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 715 (1978). In determining reserved water
rights for the Gila National Forest, the Supreme Court concluded that water was reserved for the
primary purposes of the Forest when it was established but water was not reserved for the secondary
purposes established later by the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960.
23. 86 Interior Dec. at 571. The excerpt is a definition of reserved water rights taken from
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. at 138. See 86 Interior Dec. at 571 n. 19.
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He asserted that originally, the United States obtained ownership of
western lands from cessions by foreign nations and gained plenary power
over these lands by virtue of the Property Clause.2 Plenary power over
federal lands includes the power to control the disposition and use of water
related to such lands. Any interest in this land or water is derived from
federal title and must be acquired by a congressional grant or disposition
which will not be lightly inferred by the Courts.25
Krulitz also found support for federal control over water rights in the
Supremacy Clause,28 which permits the United States to exercise control
without compliance with state law, unless Congress clearly mandates that
state regulations are to be followed.
Krulitz concluded that the United States continues to exercise control
over federal land and water without regard to state law unless there is a
clear congressional mandate providing for state control. 8
Next, Krulitz discussed congressional legislation that could provide
for state control of water rights. He began this discussion by stating that
enabling legislation providing for admission of a state into the Union is not
a congressional mandate sufficient to divest the United States of control
over federal land and water. By itself, the equal footing doctrine does not
grant control of federal water to the states. Therefore, the states must look
to other legislation for such a grant from Congress.
The Western states adopted the appropriation doctrine, developed
from mining laws, which is a priority system of uses without regard to
ownership of lands appurtenant to the water. In contrast, common law
riparian rules originally applied to public lands. As a result, conflicts arose
on public lands between federal patentees who claimed riparian water
rights and prior appropriators who claimed water rights under state law.30
Congress passed three statutes which resolved these conflicts "in favor
24. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 provides:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in
this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of
any particular State.
25. 86 Interior Dec. at 563.
26. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
27. 86 Interior Dec. at 564.
28. Id. at 563.
29. Id. at 564.
30. Id. at 565.
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of prior appropriators" '31 and provide the basis for state regulation of water
rights on federal land. By the Mining Acts of 18662 and 1870,33 "Congress
in effect waived its proprietary and riparian rights to water on the public
domain to the extent that water is appropriated by members of the public
under state law."3- 4 Krulitz concluded that, as a result of these acts, an
assertion of federal water rights must be confined to unappropriated water
on public lands.35
The third act, the Desert Land Act of 1877,38 is a homesteading act
that granted large tracts of land to a person who irrigated and reclaimed
the land. The Act provided water rights to the homesteader for those
purposes and went on to state:
all the surplus water over and above such actual appropriation
and use together with the water of all lakes, rivers, and other
sources of supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall
remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the
public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes sub-
ject to existing rights.3 7
Krulitz found several limitations in this excerpt and discussed the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the limitations.
The Supreme Court made it clear in Federal Power Commission v.
Oregon8 that the Act is limited to sources of water on the public lands and
does not apply to federal "reservations. 83 The Act is also limited to
unused, unappropriated water. Therefore, the water the federal govern-
ment was using in 1877 was not free for appropriation. °
The Act does not address the question of how the federal government
is to acquire water rights on public lands. Krulitz discussed a number of
cases which held that private water users and patentees of public land must
acquire water rights in accordance with state law but do not mention how
the federal government is to acquire water rights. 1
Krulitz relied on dictum in United States v. Rio Grande Dam and
31. Id.
32. Lode Mining Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 51
(1976)).
33. Placer Mining Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 218 (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 52
(1976)).
34. 86 Interior Dec. at 565.
35. Id. at 565-66.
36. Desert Land Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 321
(1976)).
37. 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1976).
38. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
39. 86 Interior Dec. at 567 (citing 349 U.S. at 488) (emphasis in opinion).
40. id.
41. Id. at 568.
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Irrigation Co.42 to support his contention that the federal government has
the right to use unappropriated water for congressionally mandated
beneficial uses without compliance with state law. In Rio Grande, the
Court stated that the state legislatures could establish their own systems of
water law but could not destroy (1) "the right of the United States to the
continued flow of water bordering its lands needed for the beneficial use of
government property"; (2) the navigability of navigable streams."'
He disagreed with the dictum in California v. United States," where
the Court said "that there are two limitations on the states' 'exclusive
control of its streams-reserved rights. . .and the navigation servi-
tude,' -45 citing Rio Grande. Krulitz maintained that Rio Grande did not
limit federal rights to the "higher reserved rights standard" but allowed
federal rights "under a lesser standard of water necessary for the beneficial
uses of government property. 46
Krulitz found the Supreme Court dicta "somewhat at war with one
another" because the Desert Land Act was enacted to promote settlement
of public lands and was directed at the public and not at the Federal
Government. Nevertheless, he finally concluded that "the United States
did not divest itself of its authority, as sovereign, to use unappropriated
waters on the public lands for governmental purposes" by the Acts of 1866
and 1870 and the Desert Land Act.4
As further support for his conclusion, Krulitz cited United States v.
New Mexico,48 in which the Court recognized federal reserved water
rights. The Court said:
The Court has previously concluded that whatever powers the
states acquired over their waters as a result of congressional acts
and admission to the Union, however, Congress did not intend
thereby to relinquish its authority to reserve unappropriated
water in the future for use on appurtenant lands withdrawn from
the public domain for specific federal purposes (citations
omitted) .'9
Krulitz argued further that it was easy to understand why Congress
repeatedly provided that state law would govern ac4uisition of water
rights. "In a constitutional context, this so-called 'express deference to
42. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
43. 86 Interior Dec. at 565 (citing 174 U.S. at 703).
44. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
45. 86 Interior Dec. at 568 (citing 438 U.S. at 662).
46. Id. at 569.
47. Id.
48. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
49. 86 Interior Dec. at 570 (citing 438 U.S. at 698).
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state water law' is essential to divest the United States of its inherent power
and control over its property." 50 Furthermore, Congress is aware of this
state-federal struggle over control of water and it has never enacted any
law that requires the Federal Government to follow state law in every
instance. 1
Finding that the United States has not granted away its right to make
use of unappropriated waters on federal land,52 Solicitor Krulitz next
explained the necessity for and nature of the non-reserved water rights.
The Solicitor explained that federal agencies have always appropri-
ated the water on the lands they administer to carry out various programs.
This appropriation is "necessary to carry out the secondary uses for which
many federal reservations are administered. It is also essential for the
management and administration of non-reserved federal lands."'53
Krulitz maintained that the non-reserved federal water right arises
for "congressionally-authorized uses."15 The right begins with the actual
use of the water, not by implication as a reserved water right does. The
priority date of the non-reserved water right is "the date action is taken
leading to actual use."'55 The United States may not interfere with other
water rights that have a priority date under state law that is earlier in time
to the United States' right. 6
Non-reserved water rights will usually be allowed under state water
law but Krulitz found that federal appropriations "cannot be strictly
limited by what state water law says is a 'diversion' of water or a 'beneficial
use' for which water can be appropriated. 57 Only Congress, by authority
of the Property Clause, may control the disposition and use of water on its
land. Legislation passed by Congress regarding public lands preempts
conflicting state legislation. "The United States therefore retains the
power to utilize those unappropriated waters to carry out the management
objectives specified in congressional directives. "58
The last question Krulitz addressed regarding non-reserved federal
water rights was to what extent the federal government must comply with
state water law in asserting its water rights. In United States v. New
Mexico, the Supreme Court suggested in dictum that where there is not a
reserved right "'there arises the contrary inference that Congress in-
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 571.




57. Id. at 575.
58. Id.
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tended' federal agencies to 'acquire water in the same manner as any other
public or private appropriator.' "" Krulitz stated: "It is not clear whether
the Court was referring generally to the concept of appropriation of water
used by the Western states, or full compliance with procedural and
substantive state water law, or only compliance with state procedures."' 0
Krulitz concluded that the Supreme Court could not have intended
that the United States comply with state substantive law because a federal
agency would have to vary land management policy "significantly" in
different states to comply with the water laws of each state. He found it
"reasonable to conclude" that non-reserved water rights are not "depen-
dent upon state law in defining their substantive contours.""'
Krulitz could not determine whether compliance with state procedu-
ral law was required but stated that such compliance had the advantages of
putting other appropriators on notice and allowing "better integration of
state and federal water rights."62 He concluded that the better policy
would be to follow state procedural law "to the greatest practicable
extent."63 Nevertheless, this compliance with state law may not be
required and "should not be construed as a waiver of any rights to use
water."
64
Having concluded that the United States possesses non-reserved
water rights, Krulitz inventoried which non-reserved water rights may be
acquired by the various agencies within the Department of the Interior. 5
59. Id. at 576 (citing 438 U.S. at 702).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 576-77.
62. Id. at 577.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 612 to 616.
I. Bureau of Land Management Non-Reserved Water Rights.
The Taylor Grazing Act and FLPMA are the major statutes providing for management of
public lands. These acts require appropriation of water to carry out the objectives
established by Congress. Krulitz noted that his predecessors, specifically Solicitor White,
held that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) had the right to use unappropriated
water to carry out objectives of the Taylor Grazing Act without compliance with state water
law. Krulitz affirmed this holding although he did not agree with all of Solicitor White's
comments. However, Krulitz restated the policy to comply with state law as much as
possible. Similarly, Krulitz concluded that FLPMA required the appropriation of water to
carry out the congressional objectives of the Act and that the United States was authorized
to "appropriate unappropriated water available on the domain as of October 21, 1976, to
meet the new management objectives dictated in the Act."
2. Bureau of Reclamation Non-Reserved Water Rights.
All non-reserved water rights must be appropriated in accordance with state law.
3. National Park Service and Fish and Wildlife Service Non-Reserved Water Rights.
"The National Park Service may appropriate water to fulfill any congressionally-
authorized function for National Park System area" for consumptive and non-consumptive
uses. The Fish and Wildlife Service non-reserved water rights are the same.
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
III. THE MARTZ OPINION
Following the release of the Krulitz Opinion, concerns were raised
regarding the alleged federal non-reserved water rights. In response, the
Secretary of the Department of the Interior decided not to implement some
of the provisions of the Krulitz Opinion concerning non-reserved water
rights except: "(i) when the agencies receive specific approval determined
on a case-by-case basis,. . ., or (ii) when required to submit all claims for
water rights in the course of litigation."66 Uncertainty resulted within the
Department of the Interior agencies regarding the steps to be taken to
"identify, establish and quantify federal water rights" and the "legal basis
and procedures to be used for assertion of non-reserved water rights. '" 7
Solicitor Martz, Krulitz' successor, issued a supplemental opinion on
January 16, 1981 to "clear up uncertainties."6 s
Martz categorized all federal water rights, as follows:
1. Federal reserved water rights.
2. "A water right initiated either (i) by application or
other appropriative act prescribed by State law, or (ii) by the
historic use of water on public lands for consumptive beneficial
uses."
3. "A right to use such unappropriated water arising on
the public lands of the United States as may be reasonably
required for Federal purposes expressly or impliedly mandated
by Act of Congress."
4. Water rights acquired by purchase, exchange, condem-
nation or gift.69
These categories are all mentioned in the Krulitz Opinion but Martz
separated federal appropriated water rights into two subparts, which
facilitates understanding of the procedural directives to follow.7 0
Martz stated that state procedural and substantive law are to be
followed with two "limited" exceptions. One is "where water has been used
historically by federal agencies for consumptive beneficial uses recognized
by State law but without conforming" to the procedural requirements of
state law. These uses are "small in quantity", "have been integrated into
the regimen of water use and development in the watershed," and have
been available for use "not withstanding any past failure. . .to conform to
procedures prescribed by state law."711
The second exception arises where the Federal Government asserts a
66. 88 Interior Dec. at 254.
67. Id.
68. Id.





water right that does not conform to substantive state law. The two
exceptions are within the non-reserved water rights theory set out in the
Krulitz Opinion. 2
Next, Martz articulated seven principles of non-reserved water rights.
These are substantially similar to those set out in the Krulitz Opinion with
the following additions:
6. Neither the New Mexico case nor any other case has
precluded the exercise of a Federal right for failure in the past to
meet the filing, permitting and other procedural requirements of
State Law.
7. Whether a particular paramount Federal purpose is man-
dated by act of Congress rests on the reasonable interpretation of
the Act and its legislative history.73
The sixth addition is consistent with the new delineation by Martz of
historical uses by the Federal Government without procedural compliance
with state law. The seventh clarifies how federal agencies should interpret
Congressional legislation on water rights.
In conclusion, Martz overruled the Krulitz determinations of non-
reserved federal water rights under the Federal Land Policy Management
Act (FLPMA) and the Taylor Grazing Act. He held that FLPMA does not
authorize water uses outside of beneficial use concepts recognized by state
law and, to the contrary § 701(g) of the Act7 4 provides that state law
regarding appropriation shall not be limited or restricted by the Act. He
found that "the same analysis and conclusion is equally applicable to the
Taylor Grazing Act. 1 5
IV. THE COLDIRON OPINION
The Solicitor's Office of the Department of the Interior came under a
new administration in 1981, and with the new administration came new
views on federal water rights:
There is great uncertainty concerning the practical applica-
tion, if any, of the non-reserved rights theory by federal agencies.
In particular, the asserted existence of this right has hampered
the ability of the State and Federal Governments to quantify
72. Id. at 256.
73. Id. at 257.
74. Section 701(g), a savings provision in FLPMA, provides that:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as limiting or restricting the power and authority of
the United States or (1) as affecting in any way any law governing appropriation or use of, or
Federal right to, water on public lands; (2) as expanding or diminishing Federal or State
jurisdiction, responsibility, interests or rights in water resource development or control;
See 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
75. 88 Interior Dc. at 257-58.
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federal water rights and to negotiate agreements to determine
the procedures and methods to be used in quantifying and
adjudicating water rights. The assertion of non-reserved rights
has also created a new and unnecessary cloud over private water
rights dependent on water sources that are on, under, over or
appurtenant to federal lands.7
In light of these observations, the new Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior, William H. Coldiron, felt it necessary to undertake a more
comprehensive review of the concept of federal non-reserved water rights.
On September 11, 1981 an opinion was issued by the Department of the
Interior containing the results of this review. Not too surprisingly, the
conclusion was that "there is no federal 'non-reserved' water right.17 8
Solicitor Coldiron's analysis of the non-reserved water right theory
began with an examination of the interrelationship of federal and state
control of water rights. The Solicitor acknowledged that Congress has the
power under the Commerce and Property Clauses to control the disposition
and use of water appurtenant to lands owned by the federal government
and that under the Supremacy Clause, it is "unlikely that state law could
preclude reasonable water use by a federal agency if Congress specifies a
particular federal usage. 17 9 However, Congress may also defer to the states
in control of water resources. Therefore, the ultimate issue, according to
the Solicitor, is whether Congress intended to delegate the authority to
regulate unappropriated water resources on public lands to the states.80
Solicitor Coldiron analyzed the question of congressional intent in
terms of the legislative history of various land use statutes affecting water
rights. He concluded that the early statehood acts, the 1866 and 1871 Acts,
the Desert Land Act, the Reclamation Act of 1902, and at least thirty-
seven other public land use statutes reflect congressional recognition of the
practical importance of local control of water resources and a general
policy of deference to state water law.8' He also noted that "only in very
limited instances has Congress maintained its power and not deferred to
state law."' 82 One of the instances cited was United States v. Rio Grande
Dam and Irrigation Co.,83 where the United States Supreme Court upheld
New Mexico's control of state water except to the extent that it interfered
76. Non-Reserved Water Rights-United States Compliance with State Law, 88 Interior Dec.
1055, 1065-57 (1981).
77. 88 Interior Dec. 1055.
78. Id. at 1064.
79. Id. at 1058.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1059-60.
82. Id. at 1060.
83. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
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with the navigation servitude. The other exception recognized by the
Solicitor was the reserved rights doctrine created by the Court in the case of
Winters v. United States.84
Nevertheless, the Solicitor believed that these cases are of relatively
minor importance to the issue of federal non-reserved water rights as the
issue was directly and definitively addressed by the Court in two 1978
cases, United States v. New Mexico85 and California v. United States.86
From similar language in both opinions the Solicitor concluded that
Congress intended to give the states broad control over water resources
which would be limited only where necessary to accomplish the original
purpose of a congressionally mandated reservation or to protect the
navigation servitude.8 7 Therefore, in analyzing land management statutes,
the presumption arises that "the United States and its agencies must
acquire water rights in accordance with state substantive and procedural
law unless necessary for the original purpose of a reservation."'88
Implicit in the Solicitor's final conclusion that "there is no federal
'non-reserved' water right"" is the assumption that none of the current
land management statutes contain evidence of a congressional intent to
retain the power of administration over the water resources on public lands
which overcomes the presumption of deference to the states. Therefore,
federal entities would be required to acquire water as would any other
private claimant under state law.90
V. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM
On March 6, 1980, suit was filed in the Fifth District Court of the
State of Wyoming to determine the rights of the United States Department
of Agriculture, through the Forest Service, to water in the Big Horn and
Shoshone National Forests.91 Because the Forest Service was asserting
claims based on the federal non-reserved water rights theory, Carol
Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General for the Land and Natural Resources
Division, asked the United States Department of Justice for a legal opinion
concerning the federal government's legal rights to unappropriated waters
on federally owned lands in the western states. 2 In response to this request
84. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
85. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
86. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
87. 88 Interior Dec. at 1064.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1065.
91. In re the Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All
Other Sources, Civ. No. 4493 (5th Jud. Dist. Wyo. Mar. 6, 1980).
92. Memorandum at 1.
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and the continuing concern over the non-reserved rights theory, the
Department issued a legal memorandum on June 17, 1982 containing a
comprehensive analysis of the federal government's rights to unappropri-
ated water on public lands.9" The Department analyzed the issue of federal
non-reserved water rights from both a constitutional basis and a statutory
basis.
A. Constitutional Basis for Federal Claims
The analysis begins with the acknowledgment that Congress has the
power under the United States Constitution to authorize the appropriation
of unappropriated water by federal land management agencies and
thereby preempt inconsistent state laws. Therefore, the question addressed
by the analysis "is not generally whether Congress has the power to
establish federal rights to unappropriated water, but whether it has
exercised that power. 94
The Department asserted that all federal claims to water outside of
state law rest on the same constitutional basis: The federal government is
not precluded from asserting the existence of water rights outside of state
law or the reserved rights doctrine. As it is stated in the memorandum,
"[t]he fact that the Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized a non-
reserved water right in haec verba does not mean that the Court would not
recognize the federal government's implied right to unappropriated water,
arising from clear congressional intent, in a situation that has not yet been
presented to it." 93
According to the Department of Justice, some of the confusion about
the federal government's right to unappropriated water in the western
states arises from arguments based on "ownership" of the unappropriated
water. In the memorandum, it is argued that Solicitor Krulitz's assertion of
a broad federal non-reserved water right rested in part upon the assump-
tion that the United States acquired a proprietary interest in all unappro-
priated water on public lands at the time it acquired the territories that
became the western states, and that it never subsequently granted away the
proprietary interest. Thus, if the United States "owns" the water, "it may
be contended that all that is necessary to perfect its rights is use of that
water for an authorized federal purpose; a state cannot impose any
restriction on that use unless Congress had explicitly granted an ownership
interest to the states."' However, if the statehood acts and the federal land
acts of the 1860's and 1870's gave ownership to the states of all
93. Memorandum.
94. Id. at 47-48.
95. Id. at 50.
96. Id. at 51-52.
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unappropriated water within their borders, then to acquire water rights in
such water the federal government must withdraw certain lands from the
scope of the acts, acquire the rights through purchase, exchange or
condemnation, or appropriate the water under state law.97
The Department asserted, however, that neither theory can be used to
adequately deny or prove the existence of federal non-reserved water
rights. Furthermore, either theory presents problems concerning the
constitutionality of the reserved rights doctrine. According to the
memorandum,
. . .if Congress, either by statehood acts or land management
statutes, gave the states ownership of all unappropriated waters
on the public domain, on what basis can the federal government
reserve some of the water for a federal use, without compensa-
tion, by a withdrawal of land made after ownership of the waters
passed on to the states? On the other hand, with respect to federal
claims, the Supreme Court has clearly limited the reserved rights
that the United States can assert to those which are minimally
necessary to fulfill the explicit or necessarily implied congres-
sional intent, and has recognized that the United States will not,
in every instance have reserved rights to all unappropriated water
on federal reserved lands. If the United States owned all the
unappropriated water on the public domain at the time a
particular parcel was reserved and had plenary control over its
disposition, this limitation would appear to be superfluous, and
the Court's extended analysis of the scope of the reserved right
doctrine unnecessary. 98
The Department concluded that the claims of ownership of natural
resources by the states or by the federal government are actually claims of
regulatory authority over unappropriated water on public lands. There-
fore, the right to unappropriated water on federal lands should be analyzed
in terms of competing regulatory jurisdiction rather than competing
ownership. 9
To this end, the Department examined the Mining Acts of 1866 and
1870 and the Desert Land Act of 1877. Recognizing that Congress has the
power to cede its constitutional authority over federal uses of unappropri-
ated water on federal lands to the states, the Department looked to see
whether the Mining Acts or the Desert Land Act divested the government
of that authority. 100
97. Id. at 52-53.
98. Id. at 53-54.
99. Id. at 54-56.
100. Id. at 56.
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The Supreme Court's treatment of these acts has been, in the view of
the Department, "ambiguous and far from definitive." 101 Although lan-
guage from some of the opinions concerning these acts could be construed
as vesting authority over unappropriated water in the states, "the sounder
view is that the Mining Acts and Desert Land Act authorize state control
only over appropriations by private individuals of unappropriated water on
federal lands and do not, by their terms, cede to the states' control over the
federal government's use of water for federal purposes and programs." 102
This belief is based on language from the Pelton Dam10 3 decision and
Cappaert v. United States'04 relating state control over water resources to
private appropriators. It is consistent with the legislative history and
background of the acts suggesting that the primary purpose of the water
rights provisions was to clarify that private patentees or users of federal
lands would not acquire rights to unappropriated water except as recog-
nized by state law.10
5
B. Statutory Basis for Federal Claims
Although the Department of Justice concluded that Congress did not
cede its regulatory authority over federal use of unappropriated water on
federal lands to the western states by the Mining Acts and the Desert Land
Act, the Department recognized that Congress, through those acts and
subsequent land acts, acknowledged the development of comprehensive
state water codes and administrative systems applicable to unappropriated
water on federal, as well as privately owned land. Therefore the issue that
had to be addressed was when and how federal statutory law displaces state
water law.' 06 Did Congress, by authorizing certain uses of federal lands,
also intend to authorize the acquisition of water for those uses without
regard to limitations imposed by state law? 07
The Department believed that under the federal non-reserved rights
theory propounded by Solicitor Krulitz, the requisite intent to displace
control over the appropriation of unappropriated water could be inferred
merely from Congress' authorization to federal agencies to manage federal
lands; no specific congressional intent to displace state control over water
need be shown. On the other hand, the states had argued that unless
Congress has set specific conditions on the acquisition or use of water by
101. Id. at 57.
102. Id. at 58.
103. Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
104. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
105. Memorandum at 58.
106. Id. at 61.
107. Id. at 63-64.
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federal agencies or has reserved the underlying land, federal agencies are
limited to water rights obtainable under state substantive and procedural
law.108
The Department recognized that the Supreme Court decisions in
California v. United States and United States v. New Mexico are relevant
to an analysis of the federal rights theory, but it also believed that both
critics and proponents of the federal non-reserved rights theory have
focused on isolated language in both cases that do nt provide an entirely
satisfactory rationale for either conclusion. 109
According to the Department of Justice, critics of the non-reserved
right point to three passages from California and New Mexico that they
feel completely dispose of any contention that any federal non-reserved
water rights exist:110
The Court noted that there are two limitations to the State's
exclusive control of its streams-reserved rights so far at least as
may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government
property, and the navigation servitude. The Court, however, was
careful to emphasize with respect to these limitations on the
States' power that, except where the reserved rights or navigation
servitude of the United States are invoked, the State has total
authority over its internal waters."1'
Where water is only valuable for a secondary use of the
reservation. . .there arises the contrary inference that Congress
intended, consistent with its other views, that the United States
would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or
private appropriator. 1 2
[T]he 'reserved rights doctrine' is a doctrine built on
implication and is an exception to Congress' explicit deference to
state water law in other areas.""
The Justice Department noted, however, that these passages must be
read in context. For example, in the language quoted from California the
Court was merely characterizing its holding in the Rio Grande case. In the
remainder of the opinion the Court recognized that there may be other
circumstances under which a federal statute would preempt the state's
exclusive control of its streams.11 4
108. Id. at 64.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 65.
111. California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 662.
112. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702.
113. Id. at 715.
114. Memorandum at 66.
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Likewise, the often cited language in New Mexico that the United
States must acquire water "in the same manner as any other public or
private appropriator" must be considered in context. Because the only
issue before the Court in New Mexico was the scope of the Forest Service's
reserved rights, the Court's statement was made only in the context of
federal reserved lands.
1 15
Finally, the Court's reference in New Mexico to the reserved rights
doctrine as an exception to Congress' policy of deference to state water law
"does not imply that reserved rights are the only exception."116
On the other hand, the opinions cannot be read as narrowly as the
proponents of the non-reserved theory would like. Solicitor Krulitz, for
example, argued that when the Court in New Mexico stated that federal
agencies must acquire water for secondary uses "in the same manner" as
other appropriators, it only meant that the right must be acquired through
"appropriation" rather than by "reservation" of the land. The Department
of Justice, however, found that on these occasions the Court referred
expressly to congressional intent that water be acquired under state law.
"7
Therefore "the most logical reading of the Court's language is that water
that is not necessary to carry out the particular primary purposes
mandated by Congress for the federal reservation in question must be
acquired in compliance with applicable state substantive and procedural
law."11 8
Solicitor Krulitz also argued that because state law must fall if
"inconsistent" with congressional directives, federal non-reserved water
rights must be recognized. The Department, however, concluded that the
Court in California contemplated that "inconsistent" state conditions
would only include those that would conflict with explicit statutory
provisions concerning use of.water that would entirely frustrate the major
purposes of a federal project. This does not preclude the state from
imposing conditions on secondary or incidental features of a federal
project.119
According to the Department, "the primary importance of the
Court's decisions in California and New Mexico to the federal non-
reserved rights theory lies in the Court's mode of analysis, particularly in
the significance attributed by the Court to Congress' history of deference to
state water law."120 The effect of this deference is the creation of a
115. Id. at 67.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 68-69.
118. Id. at 69.
119. Id. at 69-70.
120. Id. at 70.
[Vol. 4
NON-RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
presumption that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, Congress
intended federal agencies to acquire water rights in accordance with state
law.12 1
The Department also found the recent United States Supreme Court
decision of United States v. Kimball Foods, Inc.122 to be helpful. In that
case, the Court considered whether contractual liens arising from certain
loan programs take precedence over private liens established under state
commercial laws. The Court recognized that federal law governed the
rights of the United States arising under the loan programs but held that
application of federal law does not require the creation of a uniform federal
rule in all cases, and therefore the priorities should be determined under
state law.12 3
The Department argued that the significance attributed by the Court
in Kimball to the expressions of a congressional policy of deference to the
states and the unwillingness of the Court to create federal rules of priority
absent a showing that application of state rules will frustrate specific
federal interests echoes the reasoning of the Court in both California and
New Mexico. Therefore, the teaching point of Kimbell, California and
New Mexico is that state law may control federal rights and liabilities
arising under federal programs where "the application of state law will not
frustrate specific federal purposes or interests, where the federal program
has been and can be adapted to state law, and where implication of federal
rights would substantially disrupt expectations of private individuals based
upon an existing comprehensive state regulatory scheme."12 4
The next step of the analysis, according to the Department, was to
determine whether Congress intended to carve out an exception to its
general policy of deference to state law in any of the various land
management acts. The Department believed that California and New
Mexico "limit the bases upon which federal water rights may be asserted
without regard to state law to specific congressional directives or authori-
zations that override inconsistent state law and the establishment of
primary purposes for the management of federal lands or construction and
operation of federal projects that would be frustrated by the application of
state law." '125
The Department also asserted that the Court's discussion in New
Mexico of primary purposes and secondary uses is not necessarily limited
to federal lands that have been formally withdrawn from the public
121. Id. at 72.
122. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
123. Id. at 726, 728.
124. Memorandum at 76.
125. Id.
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domain, but could be applied equally as well to "acquired" lands that have
been set aside for specific federal purposes.12 6 Similarly, the Department
argued that "Congress could establish 'primary purposes' for the manage-
ment of public domain lands that could be the basis for federal water
rights. ' 127 If Congress specified particular purposes for which the lands
should be maintained and managed with the implicit intent that water be
available for those purposes, then there would be a solid basis for the
assertion of a federal non-reserved water right.
128
In its conclusion, the Department stated that federal non-reserved
water rights cannot be created merely by the assignment of land manage-
ment functions to a federal agency as suggested by Solicitor Krulitz. The
federal constitutional authority to preempt state water law must be clearly
and specifically exercised, either expressly or by necessary implication;
otherwise, the presumption is that the western states retain control over the
allocation of unappropriated water within their borders.1 2 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The next logical step is for the agencies with responsibility for
enforcement and administration of the various land management statutes
to review their statutory authority and water needs and make an initial
determination as to whether a basis exists for asserting federal non-
reserved water rights as envisioned by the Department of Justice. Congres-
sional intent to preempt state control over unappropriated water in the
western states could be inferred where the conditions imposed under state
law on the use or disposition of water by a federal agency conflict with
specific statutory directives authorizing a federal project or directing the
use of federal lands, or if application of state law would prevent the federal
agency from accomplishing specific purposes mandated by Congress for
the federal lands.
Although the Department of Justice admits that it has not undertaken
an independent analysis of the various land management statutes, it doubts
that the agencies will find the intent needed for the assertion of non-
reserved federal water rights within those statutes. This does not mean that
the federal government is powerless to assert such a right in the future. The
Department of Justice made it clear that the choice is up to Congress.
Because Congress has the power under the United States Constitution to
supercede state law, Congress has the power to create federal non-reserved
126. Id. at 77-78. An example would be national forest lands acquired under the provisions of the
Weeks Act, 16 U.S.C. § 515 (1976).
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water rights. The only requirement is that Congress indicate either by clear
expression or by implication that such rights are to be vested in the federal
government.
The Department of Justice's analysis of the federal non-reserved
water rights issue is the better-reasoned and more correct analysis of the
issue. However, because the Department addressed only the legal issues
raised by the federal non-reserved water rights theory, some doubt may
remain as to the application of the legal principles outlined by the
Department to specific factual situations. The final resolution of the
federal non-reserved water rights theory may have to await careful and
comprehensive adjudications by the courts in each of the western states.
